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Abstract
With inflation under control in many in middle income countries (MICs), it is now swings in
credit, investment and asset prices that affect these countries the most. In this paper we
present a framework to analyze both theoretically and empirically how credit market shocks
are propagated and amplified in MICs.The strength of the credit channel in our model derives
from two key characteristics of MICs: (i)a sharp asymmetry across the tradables (T) sector
and the more bank-dependent nontradables (N) sector; and (ii)a significant degree of currency
mismatch in the N-sector. This makes movements in the real exchange rate the driving
element in the amplification of shocks. The equilibrium imposes unambiguous
contemporaneous linkages among key macroeconomic variables and allows us to derive
structural VARs. Estimating these VARs using quarterly data for a group of MICs, we find
evidence for a strong credit channel, for a balance sheet effect and for asymmetric sectorial
responses. Our findings indicate that inflation targeting is not sufficient to guarantee
economic stability, as such policy might overlook the development of lending booms and
associated sectorial asymmetries.
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Credit market conditions are playing an increasingly important role in middle
income countries (MICs). With inﬂation under control in many MICs, it is now
swings in credit, investment and asset prices that aﬀect MICs the most. In this
paper we present a framework to analyze both theoretically and empirically how
credit market shocks are propagated and ampliﬁed in MICs.
The credit channel is strong in MICs. The spread between lending and foreign
interest rates has a strong eﬀe c to nG D Pa n da ne v e ns t r o n g e re ﬀect on credit.1
The strength of the credit channel in MICs is associated with a sharp asymme-
try between the tradeables (T) sector and the more bank-dependent nontradables
(N) sector. Each of the sectors reacts diﬀerently to shocks, with real exchange
rate ﬂuctuations playing a key role in ampliﬁcation. Furthermore, credit varies
strongly with the N-to-T output ratio and movements in credit are strongly cor-
related with those of the real exchange rate —the relative price between N and T
goods. In contrast, GDP and credit growth are not closely correlated, and the
credit-to-GDP ratio experiences large swings.
These comovements and asymmetric sectorial responses are not observed in
high income countries. They appear to be the same across MICs, in spite of dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes, and arise both in the course of boom-bust cycles as
well as at higher frequencies. The patterns thus raise several questions. Is the
monetary transmission mechanism in MICs the same as in high income countries?
What is an appropriate estimation framework to characterize economic ﬂuctua-
tions in MICs? What are the implications for the design of economic policy?
In this paper we argue that credit market imperfections prevalent in MICs are
the key to explaining the stylized facts, and thus to addressing the questions we
have raised. We document both the stylized facts and the imperfections that can
explain them. We then present a model with a ﬁnancial accelerator in which real
exchange rate ﬂuctuations play a key role in amplifying the eﬀects of shocks and
generating a strong credit channel.
The equilibrium imposes unambiguous contemporaneous linkages among key
macroeconomic variables and allows us to derive structural VARs. Estimating
these VARs using quarterly data for a group of MICs, we ﬁnd evidence for a
1In the US the eﬀect of the spread on output has been considered an indicator that monetary
shocks aﬀect the economy through a credit channel, which is distinct from the traditional money
channel. See for instance, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000), Friedman and Kuttner (1992),
and Stock and Watson (1989).strong credit channel, for asymmetric sectorial responses and for balance sheet
eﬀects.
In MICs there is a pronounced asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities across
the T- and N-sectors: T-sector ﬁrms tend to be large and have access to world
capital markets; N-sector ﬁrms are smaller on average and are bank-dependent.2
In addition, a substantial amount of N-sector debt is dollar denominated, while
the income streams that service those debts are in domestic currency. As a result,
the degree of currency mismatch is signiﬁcant.3 Finally, creditors are covered,
either explicitly or implicitly, by systemic guarantees. It is expected that if a
critical mass of debtors risks insolvency, policies to ensure that creditors will be
repaid will be implemented
When there is a positive shock to the lending rate, N-sector agents can borrow
less at each level of net worth. The resulting reduction in demand for N-goods
generates a fall in the price of N goods. In the presence of currency mismatch
this real depreciation reduces the net worth of N-sector agents. The reduction in
net worth, in turn, further tightens borrowing constraints, reinforcing the drop
in demand for N-goods, and so on. T-sector agents, on the other hand, are not
bank-dependent and so T-output is not negatively aﬀected by the shock. Thus,
there is a decline in both the N-to-T output ratio and the credit-to-GDP ratio, as
is observed in the data.4 In sum, the N-sector exhibits a balance sheet eﬀect that
acts as a ﬁnancial accelerator to amplify the eﬀect of shocks on the economy.5
Of course, in order for a model to provide a satisfactory rationalization for
the ampliﬁcation mechanism, the existence of currency mismatch and borrowing
constraints cannot be taken as exogenously given. Furthermore, the model should
allow us to derive a set of equilibrium equations that are suitable for estimation
across MICs. To achieve both objectives we will consider a model of a monetary
2In MICs T-sector ﬁrms have easy access to external ﬁnance because they can either pledge
export receivables as collateral, or can get guarantees from closely linked ﬁrms.
3Even when the banks’ balance sheets are equilibrated, banks face a de facto currency mis-
match because they lend primarily to the N-sector. Thus, they face insolvency risk.
4There are two views as to what mechanism underlies the credit channel: credit falls because
either ﬁrms’ ability to borrow falls or banks capacity to lend declines. We do not distinguish
between these two views in this paper.
5The sectorial asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities prevalent in MICs is closely related to
the small vs. large dichotomy made in the US literature. In the US researchers have found an
excess sensitivity of small banks and ﬁrms (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap and
Stein (2000)). The diﬀerence in MICs is the special role of the N-Sector’s excess sensitivity in
giving rise to real exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
2economy with credit market imperfections that is subject to demand shocks.
The stable equilibrium of such an economy has two attractive features. First,
the paths of the key variables are independent of the nominal exchange rate regime,
which is important because of a wide variation across MICs in this regard. Sec-
ond, an empirical characterization of economic ﬂuctuations follows directly from
the equilibrium: (a) it determines which variables to include in the empirical spec-
iﬁcation; and (b) it provides us with identifying restrictions to characterize causal
links among the variables, and to structurally identify the eﬀects of shocks.
With structural VARs in hand, we estimate the strength of the credit channel
using quarterly data for several MICs. We ﬁnd that both GDP and credit exhibit
strongly negative responses to shocks to the interest rate spread (Figure 4.1), indi-
cating that there is a strong credit channel in MICs. We also ﬁnd that in response
to an increase in the spread there is a decline in the N-to-T output ratio and a real
depreciation (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). There is a striking similarity between these
impulse response functions and the simulated responses in our model economy,
which are shown in Figure 4.5.
The VARs implied by our model are similar to those in the literature in that
they link an interest rate spread with a measure of output. However, there are
several diﬀerences related to the variables we include, and to the way we identify
our structural VARs. We include variables that measure asymmetric sectorial pat-
terns: the N-to-T output ratio and the real exchange rate. Second, we include the
diﬀerence between the domestic lending rate and the world interest rate, which is
the relevant spread in the presence of currency mismatch and a sectorial asym-
metry in ﬁnancing opportunities.
With regards to identiﬁcation, the ordering of our VAR follows directly from
the model’s equilibrium. As the model implies, the spread is not allowed to
respond to GDP surprises within a quarter. In MICs the monetary authority has
little leeway to inﬂuence the spread through standard open market operations.
Instead, changes in the spread reﬂect mainly changes in the anticipated generosity
of the guarantees. The expected generosity, in turn, depends on the ability and
the willingness of the government to cover the guarantees. Clearly, these factors
cannot be changed at short notice in response to a quarterly GDP surprise.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we characterize the comove-
ments between key macro variables across MICs, and we present an intuitive
explanation of the ampliﬁcation mechanism. In Section 3 we present a model that
formalizes the mechanism and establishes causal links among the comovements.
In Section 4 we use the restrictions implied by the model to estimate structural
3VARs. In Section 5 we provide evidence for the credit market imperfections that
are key to our argument. In Section 6 we present some extensions. Finally, in
Sections 7 and 8 we present a review of the literature and the conclusions, respec-
tively.
2. Comovements and an Ampliﬁcation Mechanism
Here we give a ﬁrst pass at the comovements among key macroeconomic variables
in MICs, and give an overview of a mechanism that ampliﬁes shocks in MICs and
produces these comovements.
We characterize the comovements by means of panel regressions and event
windows over the period 1980-1999 on a set of MICs where, in addition to banks,
the stock market is a viable source of ﬁnance.6 In the panel regressions, we
allow for random and ﬁxed eﬀects.7 The partial correlations cannot, of course, be
interpreted as causal relations. However, they indicate what variables theoretical
models should emphasize.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 2.1 shows that an increase in credit is associated
with (i) a decline in the interest rate spread, (ii) an increase in the ratio of N-
to-T output, and (iii) a real appreciation. It is remarkable that these partial
correlations are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Correlation (i) suggests the existence
of a credit channel. Correlation (ii) is consistent with the fact that the N-sector
is more credit-constrained than the T-sector. Correlation (iii) is consistent with
t h ee x i s t e n c eo fab a l a n c es h e e te ﬀect.8
Among components of GDP, what is surprising is the dog that didn’t bark:
consumption and net exports do not move with credit growth. In contrast, invest-
ment and the ﬁscal deﬁcit vary strongly with credit. Regressions 2 and 3 show
that all parameters, except those on consumption and net exports, are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. We ﬁnd similar results using ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (Table 2.2).
After dropping insigniﬁcant variables, all remaining variables are signiﬁcant at the
6This set consists of 39 countries and is deﬁned in Tornell and Westermann (2002). See
Appendix for details.
7All variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to avoid the issues associated with non-
stationarity.
8The MICs we examine have experienced crises from time to time during the sample period.
We are not limiting ourselves to analyzing the events surrounding crises, and the comovements
of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are not conditional on the occurrence of crises.
4Table 2.1: Random Eﬀects Model
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1/Real exchange rate  0.370***  0.356***  0.212* 0.216** 
 (0.074)  (0.089)  (0.112)  (0.106) 
N/T output ratio  0.294***  0.387***  0.241* 0.290** 
 (0.109)  (0.127)  (0.139)  (0.137) 
Interest rate spread    -0.002**  -0.071***  -0.063*** 
   (0.001)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Investment     0.306***  0.219*** 
     (0.107)  (0.078) 
Consumption     -0.228   
     (0.263)   
Deficit     0.614**  0.591** 
     (0.249)  (0.259) 
Net exports      0.000   
     (0.001)   
Adj. R
2  0.211 0.180 0.363 0.376 
#  countries  30 26 25 25 
 
Note:. The table reports the regression results from a model with random 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at 
the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
5Table 2.2: Fixed Eﬀects Model
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1/Real exchange rate  0.398***  0.374***  0.258**  0.234** 
 (0.081)  (0.053)  (0.119)  (0.113) 
N/T output ratio  0.273***  0.295***  0.198  0.283* 
 (0.081)  (0.040)  (0.151)  (0.146) 
Interest rate spread    -0.002  -0.073*** -0.064*** 
   (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Investment     0.324***  0.203** 
     (0.112)  (0.083) 
Consumption     -0.390   
     (0.282)  
Deficit     0.617**  0.583** 
     (0.295)  (0.294) 
Net exports      0.000   
     (0.001)  
Adj. R
2  0.155 0.143 0.317 0.376 
# countries  30  26  25  25 
 
Note:. GLS regression results from a model with fixed effects. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level.  
65% level and have the same sign as in the random eﬀects model.9
We do not focus on crises in this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to
emphasize that around times of crisis, macroeconomic variables display similar
comovements to those shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows that prior
to a crisis there is a real appreciation and a lending boom during which credit
grows unusually fast. In the aftermath of a crisis there is typically a short-lived
recession and a protracted credit crunch that mainly aﬀects the N-sector. In fact,
N-production declines relative to the output of the T-sector and the credit-to-
GDP ratio continues to fall for several years after the crisis. Investment is the
component of GDP that exhibits by far the largest (and statistically signiﬁcant)
deviations from tranquil times, while consumption deviations are very mild and
insigniﬁcant.10
These stylized facts suggest that investment, rather than consumption, should
play a key role in the ampliﬁcation mechanism. Furthermore, they indicate that
a model of the credit channel in MICs should generate an equilibrium path along
which credit varies negatively with the spread and the real exchange rate, and
positively with the N-to-T output ratio.
9A further issue is the apparent presence of serial correlation in the error terms as reﬂected
in the low value of the Durbin Watson test statistics. We will deal with this issue in section 4.
10Figure 2.1 is taken from Tornell and Westerman (2002). See that paper for details.
7Figure 2.1: The Boom-Bust Cycle
 




c)  N-to-T Output Ratio        d) Interest Rate Spread  
 
 
e)   Investment/GDP      f)  Consumption/GDP   
 
 
Note: The figures show the average behavior of the respective variable, across 39 countries around twin currency 
and banking crises during the period 1980-1999. Index t in the figures refers to the year during which a twin 
crisis takes place. The figures are the visual representations of the point estimates and standard errors from 
regressions in which the respective variable in the graph is the dependent variable, regressed on time dummies 
preceding and following a crisis. The panel data estimations include fixed effects and use a GLS estimator. The 
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8Overview of the Model
We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with
two sectors: a tradables sector (T) and a nontradables sector (N). T-sector agents
have access to perfect capital markets, but N-sector agents face agency problems.
Thus, their credit is constrained by their net worth. Using this framework we
construct an equilibrium in which borrowers ﬁnd it optimal to denominate their
debt in foreign currency.
Along the equilibrium path the ampliﬁcation mechanism works as follows. An
increase in the domestic lending rate leads to higher debt service obligations and
thus implies that ﬁrms can now borrow less at each level of net worth. Lower
borrowing results in lower investment. This direct eﬀect is ampliﬁed if there is
currency mismatch and part of N-sector’s demand comes from the N-sector itself.
In this case, the fall in demand for N-goods, leads to a real depreciation. Since N-
sector agents have dollar debt on the books, while their revenues are denominated
in the local currency, there is a fall in N-sector’s proﬁts and net worth. A vicious
circle ensues as lower net worth leads to even lower investment, which leads to a
lower demand for N-goods and a steeper real depreciation, which leads to lower
net worth and so on.
T-sector agents have access to international capital markets and can more eas-
ily substitute away from domestic borrowing. Thus, their decisions are mostly
aﬀected by the world interest rate, not by the domestic lending rate. Therefore,
an increase in the spread between these two interest rates is associated with a real
depreciation, a decline in the N-to-T output ratio, and a fall in credit. Further-
more, the sectorial asymmetry implies that the decline in GDP growth is milder
than that of credit. This explains the persistent swings in the credit-to-GDP ratio
observed in the data.
One question remains. Why is there a currency mismatch? The answer relies
on the existence of systemic guarantees. It is a stylized fact, which we document
in this paper, that governments insure creditors against systemic crises. That is,
if a critical mass of borrowers is on the brink of bankruptcy, the government will
i m p l e m e n tp o l i c i e st oe n s u r et h a tc r e d i t o r sg e tr e p a i d( a tl e a s ti np a r t )a n dt h u s
avoid an economic meltdown. These policies may come in the form of an easing
of monetary policy, the maintenance of an exchange rate peg, or the handing out
of checks.11
11Systemic guarantees, broadly deﬁned, are not limited to MICs but are in fact prevalent the
world over. For instance, consider the announcement made by the Bank of Japan in September
9If the expected generosity of the guarantee is large enough, borrowers will ﬁnd
it optimal to take on insolvency risk.B yd o i n gs ot h e yc a nc a s hi no nt h es u b s i d y
implicit in the guarantee, as the government will pay the debt obligation in case
of insolvency. If the real exchange rate is expected to be suﬃciently variable,
currency mismatch is a prime vehicle for N-sector agents to take on insolvency
risk. By denominating their debt in foreign currency, N-sector agents will pay dirt
cheap interest rates as someone else will repay creditors in case of a sharp real
depreciation.
Since the real exchange rate is endogenous, a self-reinforcing mechanism arises.
Agents choose dollar debt only if there is enough expected real exchange rate
variability to make it optimal to do so. The required variability, in turn, arises
only if there is currency mismatch at the aggregate level, and demand risk is
translated into insolvency risk along the equilibrium path.
This is as far as simple intuition can bring us. Since relative prices are deter-
mined in general equilibrium we need the aid of the model to guide our intuition
as to when demand risk generates enough expected real exchange rate variability.
Some restrictions will have to be imposed on the parameters to ensure that the
right balance exists between the opposing forces at work in this economy. The
question then becomes one of whether these parameter restrictions generate an
equilibrium path that exhibits the comovements typical of MICs. Is an increase
in the spread associated with a real depreciation, as well as with higher output
and credit growth? Does a lending boom coincide with a real appreciation and an
increasing N-to-T ratio? We show in Proposition 3.2 that there is indeed a combi-
nation of parameters that ensures the existence of a ‘risky symmetric equilibrium’
(RSE) that exhibits currency mismatch and these comovements.
In Section 4 we derive structural VARs from Proposition 3.2 by shocking the
expected generosity of the guarantee (g) in an RSE. We then bring the model
to the data and investigate whether there is a strong credit channel and whether
t h e r ei sab a l a n c es h e e te ﬀect.
2002 that it will commit several billion dollars to purchase stocks owned by troubled banks. This
is an instance of how monetary policy can act as a systemic guarantee. Still another example is
the many banks that became overexposed to the telecoms and technology sectors. When these
sectors suﬀered a fall in their ability to raise funds, and risked bankruptcy, a low interest rate
policy acted as a systemic guarantee.
103. Model
We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with a
T-sector and an N-sector. The model embeds the credit market game of Schnei-
der and Tornell (2000), henceforth ST, into a monetary economy that is hit by
exogenous demand shocks. The bold lines in Figure 3.1 illustrate the channels
that the model will emphasize. The dashed lines refer to channels that are not
necessary for the argument we wish to make, but which could be added without
aﬀecting the amplifying mechanism. Key is that the demand for N-goods has an
upward sloping component. As we shall see, the fact that the N-sector demands
its own goods for investment and that currency mismatch arises in equilibrium is
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12Since the economy is small and open, the destination of T-goods is not important for our
argument.
113.1. Setup
As previously mentioned, there are N and T goods in our model economy. N-
goods can only be purchased with local currency (pesos), while T-goods can only
be purchased with foreign currency (dollars). Using pesos as the
numeraire, we will denote the nominal exchange rate by et, the price of N-goods
by pn
t , and the price of T-goods by ptr
t .
Real exchange rate variations in MICs reﬂect mainly changes in the relative
price of N and T goods.13 To capture this fact we assume that purchasing parity
holds and that the dollar price of foreign T-goods is ﬁxed, so that ptr
t = et. It







There is a continuum, of measure one, of N-producing ﬁrms run by overlapping
generations of managers. An N-sector manager is allowed to enter into one-period
debt contracts denominated in either dollars or pesos. In a dollar contract he
gets bt dollars at t and promises to pay (1 + ρt)bt dollars at t +1 . In a peso
contract he gets b
ps






are competitive risk neutral agents whose cost of funds (in dollar terms) equals
the world interest rate r.
In order for the ampliﬁcation mechanism described in the introduction to exist,
it is necessary that part of the demand for N-goods comes from the N-sector
itself. Thus, we assume that N-sector ﬁrms produce N-goods using only N-goods
as inputs (It) according to a linear production technology
q
n
t+1 = θI t (3.2)
The representative young manager begins period t with a net worth equal to etwt
pesos. Thus, his budget constraint is
p
n
t It = etwt + etbt + b
ps
t (3.3)
13Betts and Kehoe (2001) ﬁnd that in a set of 52 countries over the period 1980-2000 real
exchange rate variations reﬂect mainly changes in the relative price of N and T goods, not
movements in the international relative prices of T-goods. Among some developed countries the
latter channel is more important (Engel (1999)).













t − et+1[1 + ρt]bt (3.4)
Enforceability Problem
I no r d e rt oc a p t u r et h ef a c tt h a tN - s e c t o rﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained, we
assume that a manager will be able to divert borrowed funds at t+1 if at t he incurs
a cost proportional to his investable funds: h[etwt + etbt + b
ps
t ]. The parameter
h can be interpreted as a measure of the severity of the contract enforceability
problem, with a low h representing lax contract enforcement.
Lenders only ﬁnance plans that do not lead to diversion. Since the goal of every
manager is to maximize next period’s expected proﬁts net of diversion costs, the
plans that are ﬁnanced are those where the expected debt repayment is no greater
than the diversion cost.
Systemic Guarantees
There are several ways of modeling systemic guarantees. We choose to model
them as a commitment made by the government at time t to repay lenders, at
t +1 , af r a c t i o ngt ∈ [g,1] of the outstanding debts of all defaulting borrowers
if more than 50% of borrowers become insolvent at t +1(i.e., πt+1 < 0). The
guarantee applies to both peso and dollar debt. Thus, if a crisis were to occur at
t +1 , the bailout payment would equal







The value of gt is common knowledge as of time t. The bailout payment is ﬁnanced
by an international organization.14
Consumption and T-production
Consumption and T-output are not central to the model and will be treated
as exogenous.15 The supply of T-goods qtr
t will play no role in the determination
of equilibrium and we will refer to it only when we deﬁne GDP in Section 4.
14The bailout could instead be ﬁnanced by a tax on the T-sector.
15Demand (3.6) and a T-sector supply function of the form qtr
t+1 = εtqtr
t can be derived from an
optimizing setup in which T-sector agents have access to perfect capital markets. For example,
ST consider a setup where competitive T-producing ﬁrms produce T-goods using labor (supplied
by consumers) and T-capital as inputs, and where consumers derive utility from consumption
of both T and N-goods.
13We assume that the demand for N-goods that originates outside the N-sector is






d with probability α
0 with probability 1 − α (3.6)
There are two states of nature: in the good state there is a high demand for N-
goods (dt = d), while in the bad state there is a low demand (dt =0 ) . Expected
demand variability will be the source of expected real exchange rate variability,
the presence of which will be necessary for dollar debt to be optimal. As we shall
see, α must be large, but less than one, in order for an equilibrium to exist.16
The Money Market
To introduce a demand for pesos we assume that N-goods can be purchased
only with pesos, while T-goods can be purchased only with dollars. Furthermore,
we assume that the central bank’s assets consist only of foreign exchange reserves





t [It + Dt] and M
s
t = etRt, (3.7)
Sequence of Actions
Every new manager starts period t with net worth of etwt pesos, and chooses




t ) that satisﬁes the budget constraint and the no diversion
condition. During t+1each (now old) manager sells the output of his ﬁrm. If the
ﬁrm is solvent (πt+1 > 0), he repays debt. He then pays out a fraction c of proﬁts
to himself and passes on the remainder to the next manager. In contrast, if the
ﬁrm is insolvent (πt+1 ≤ 0) the old manager gets nothing, while the new manager
receives an ‘aid payment’ of wt dollars to jump start the ﬁrm.
Lenders receive the debt repayments of solvent ﬁr m s . I nt h ec a s et h a tm o r e
than half of the ﬁrms default, a bailout is granted. Lenders then receive a fraction
gt of the outstanding debt. Lastly, in period 0 there is both a cohort of initial
incumbent managers who have an amount q0 of nontradables to sell and a cohort
of new managers who have an endowment of w0 dollars. It follows that for t ≥ 1
16Note that it is not necessary that demand be zero in the bad state. Any d<dwill do. Note
also that we consider demand shocks instead of supply shocks (i.e., shocks to θ) because the
latter would imply a real appreciation in the bad state. This is counterfactual.










In a ‘symmetric equilibrium’ during every period (i) lenders break even; (ii)
the representative young manager chooses a plan to maximize expected proﬁts,
subject to the budget constraint and the no diversion condition, taking as given
current and future prices, as well as the generosity of the guarantee; and (iii) the
non-tradables market as well as the money market clear
dt
pt







Two comments are in order. First, the equilibrium determines only the real
exchange rate 1/pt = et/pn
t , and not the levels of pn
t and et separately. The levels
of these variables depend on the speciﬁcs of the exchange rate regime. Second,
exogenous shocks to the demand for N-goods are the only source of insolvency
risk. Demand variability, in turn, generates real exchange rate variability through
(3.9). Since dt may equal either d or 0,p t+1 might equal pt+1 with probability α
or p
t+1 with probability 1−α. We would like to emphasize that assuming demand
risk is not the same as assuming insolvency risk. The fact that dt =0does not
imply that N-ﬁrms will go bust unless a majority of N-ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant
amount of dollar debt on the books.
3.2. Currency Mismatch
There are two types of symmetric equilibria: risky and safe. In the former there is
currency mismatch and insolvency risk, while in the latter there is none. We derive
risky symmetric equilibria (RSE) in two steps. In this subsection we characterize
equilibria within a given period, taking prices as given and assuming that there











15We then ask in subsection 3.3 whether there is a self-validating equilibrium process
{pt, ¯ pt+1,p
t+1}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes (3.10).17
Consider ﬁrst the problem of an individual manager who takes current prices
(pt) a n de x pe c t e df u t u r ep r i c e s(¯ pt+1,p
t+1) as given, and who expects that a bailout
(gt) w i l lb eg r a n t e dn e x tp e r i o di nt h eb a ds t a t e ,b u tn o ti nt h eg o o ds t a t e . A
manager must decide whether to borrow, and in what currency to denominate
any debt he does take on. He may denominate the debt all in dollars or all in
pesos, or use some combination of the two. We consider the implications of each of
these choices in turn and then show that both borrowing constraints and currency
mismatch arise in equilibrium provided (3.10) holds.
Consider the case in which all debt is denominated in dollars. In this case, the
ﬁrm will go bust in the bad state (i.e., π(p
t+1) ≤ 0) provided there is insolvency
risk —i.e., the third inequality in (3.10) holds. However, since there are systemic
guarantees, lenders will get repaid a proportion gt of what the ﬁrm promises.
Thus, if the manager issues only dollar debt, the interest rate (ρt) that allows
lenders to break-even satisﬁes
[1 + ρt][α +( 1− α)gt]=1+r (3.11)
It follows that the manager will choose to borrow if and only if expected returns
are high enough so as to make the production of N-goods proﬁtable —i.e., the ﬁrst
inequality in (3.10) holds. Lenders will lend up to an amount that makes the
expected debt repayment α[1 + ρt]bt equal to the diversion cost
α[1 + ρt]bt ≤ h[wt + bt] (3.12)
Notice that this condition becomes a borrowing constraint for all gt ∈ [0,1] only
if the second inequality in (3.10) holds. If this were not the case and h,t h e
measure of the enforceability problem, were greater than α[1+r],i tw o u l da l w a y s
be cheaper to repay debt rather than to divert.
Combining borrowing constraint (3.12) with the budget constraint pn
t It =






1 − h[1 + 1−α
α gt][1 + r]−1 (3.13)
17If
αθ¯ pt+1
pt < 1+r or h





pt , there would be no currency mismatch.
16This equation shows that investment of a credit constrained ﬁrm depends not only
on the rate of return, but also on its net worth. With our linear structure, the
rate of return enters only through the positive NPV condition.
Consider now the case in which all debt is denominated in pesos. Clearly,
in this case the ﬁrm will never go bust. Since lenders must break even, the







Since (3.10) holds, the manager will borrow up to an amount that makes the





t+1 ≤ h(etwt +b
ps
t ). The budget constraint
pn
t It = etwt + b
ps
t then implies that investment is given by I
ps
t = µps wt
pt ,w h e r e
µps := 1
1−h[1+r]−1.
Will the borrowing manager choose dollar debt or peso debt? The incentives to
choose risky dollar debt derive from the fact that if a majority of N-ﬁrms become
insolvent, the government will pay part of the debt obligations of those borrowers
that go bust. Since lenders must break even, choosing dollar debt over peso debt
reduces the cost of capital from 1+r to [1+r][1+ 1−α
α gt]−1. Lower borrowing costs
ease the borrowing constraint and investment is higher relative to a plan ﬁnanced
with peso debt (It >I
ps
t ). But a risky plan has a downside in that it entails a
probability 1 − α of insolvency. To see which plan is preferred we compute the






























t+1. If crises are rare events (α → 1) and the expected guarantee gt is generous
enough, the beneﬁts of issuing dollar debt outweigh the bankruptcy costs. In
contrast, in the absence of guarantees (i.e., gt =0or α =1 ) , the two beneﬁts
associated with dollar debt disappear. Thus, the borrowing manager will refrain
from ﬁnancing his plan with risky dollar debt.18
In order to determine the equilibrium at a point in time recall that guarantees
18Consider plans in which debt is denominated partly in pesos and partly in dollars. It can
be veriﬁed that if such a plan does not lead to insolvency in any state, it generates an expected
payoﬀ of Π
ps
t+1. In contrast, if such a plan leads to insolvency in the bad state, it is dominated
by a plan in which all debt is denominated in dollars.
17apply only to systemic meltdowns. If nobody expects a bailout, everybody hedges,
and a crisis —and hence a bailout— cannot occur. In other words, a safe symmetric
equilibrium always exists. This is independent of whether there is enough real
exchange rate variability or not. However, in a world with guarantees there is
also an RSE. Indeed, suppose that a manager believes that all other managers
will borrow in dollars. He will conclude that a bailout will occur in the bad
state. Thus, he will take on real exchange rate risk and go bankrupt in the bad
state, along with all other managers, triggering a bailout. For further reference
we summarize the results of this subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Currency Mismatch). Dollar debt arises in equilibrium if
and only if there is suﬃcient expected real exchange rate variability (i.e., (3.10)




t+1. Credit is determined by net worth:
bt =[ µ(gt) − 1]wt. (3.15)
















Interest rates and investment are given by (3.11) and (3.13), respectively.
3.3. Real Exchange Rate Variability
We have seen that managers will take on dollar debt only if there is enough
anticipated real exchange rate variability ((3.10) holds), so that there are high
returns in the good state (dt = d) and a critical mass of insolvencies in the bad
state (dt =0 ) . We now reverse the question and ask instead when a risky debt
structure implies that exogenous demand variability is translated into enough
real exchange rate variability. In other words, we determine the conditions under
which (3.10) holds at all times.
At time t, the expectation of t +1 ’s prices determines investment and the
amount of dollar debt (It and bt). At t +1 ,I t and bt together with the agents’
expectations of prices at t +2will determine t +1 ’s market clearing prices (¯ pt+1
and p
t+1). Will these prices at t +1validate time t expectations under which
It and bt are selected? That is: (i) will there be widespread insolvency in the
18bad state (π(p
t+1) ≤ 0), so that it is possible to claim the subsidy implicit in the
guarantee? (ii) will there be a suﬃciently high return in the good state to ensure
that the ex-ante expected return is high enough (αθ¯ pt+1/pt ≥ 1+r)?
It turns out that in an RSE returns are determined by the evolution of net
worth. To derive the law of motion of wt consider a typical period t during which
all inherited debt is denominated in dollars and agents know that at t+1there can
be a crisis with probability 1−α. In an RSE all incumbent managers are solvent
in the good state, while all are insolvent in the bad state. Thus, in the good
state the net worth of new managers is ¯ wt =[ 1− c]πt =[ 1− c][ptqt − (1 + ρt)bt].
In contrast, in the bad state, the new cohort starts out with wt dollars. Market
clearing equation (3.16) implies that ptqt = d+µtwt, while the interest rate and the
credit equations (3.11) and (3.15) imply that the debt burden is (1 + ρt−1)bt−1 =












wt prob. 1 − α
(3.17)
with initial conditions q0 and w0, and where the cash ﬂow multiplier ηt equals
ηt := (1 − c)µt < 1 (3.18)
We restrict ηt < 1 so that (3.17) will be stable, which we require because we are
interested in analyzing high frequency ﬂuctuations around a steady state.
We can now determine when it is that (i) and (ii) above hold. Consider (i),
the requirement of widespread insolvency in the bad state. If ﬁrms have dollar
debt on the books, a bad demand shock can bankrupt them provided pt drops
suﬃciently. We show in the appendix that this is the case if and only if the aid








wt,ω ∈ (0,1) (3.19)
A small enough wt ensures that investment demand is small enough relative to
the output of N-goods to ensure that the price drops enough to bankrupt ﬁrms
with dollar debt on the books.
With regards to question (ii) (suﬃciently high ex ante returns), note that to-
morrow’s good state return θ¯ pt+1/pt will be greater than 1+r provided tomorrow’s
19demand is suﬃciently high relative to tomorrow’s supply. Since tomorrow’s in-
vestment demand is dependent on tomorrow’s net worth, and tomorrow’s supply
is determined by today’s investment (or equivalently, because of the borrowing
constraints, by today’s net worth), it is necessary that net worth be positive and
that its growth rate (wt+1/wt) be high enough. We show in the appendix that










¯ ηw0, with ¯ η := η(g =1 ) (3.20)
The appendix shows that the restrictions we have imposed ((3.10), (3.18), (3.19)
and (3.20)) can be simultaneously satisﬁed. This establishes the existence of a
stable RSE.
Proposition 3.2 (Risky Symmetric Equilibrium (RSE)). Suppose systemic
guarantees are generous (gt >g) and crises are rare events (α>α ). There is a
parameter region such that there exists a stable RSE. In this equilibrium:
• There is currency mismatch and crises occur with probability 1 − α.
• Credit, the real exchange rate and net worth evolve according to (3.15),
(3.16) and (3.17), respectively.
This proposition will be key to deriving our structural VARs. It has clear
implications about the variables that must be included in a VAR, and for the
ordering the variables need to have in order for the impulse response functions to
be structurally interpretable.
3.4. The Amplifying Mechanism
Before turning to the derivation of the VARs we describe intuitively the ampliﬁca-
tion mechanism implied by Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the expected generosity
of the guarantee gt falls permanently.19 Since lenders must break even, a lower
gt is reﬂected in a higher lending rate ρt via (3.11). A higher ρt, in turn, im-
plies higher debt service costs, and thus more incentives to divert borrowed funds.
This tightens the borrowing constraints faced by N-ﬁrms: at each level of net
19Recall that gt is the share of the outstanding debt that lenders expect to get repaid at t+1
by the government in case a meltdown takes place at t +1 .
20worth (wt) N-ﬁrms can now borrow less and thus invest less (i.e., the investment
multiplier µt falls). This is the direct eﬀect of a g shock on the economy.
There is, however, a second amplifying eﬀect. It comes about because (i) the
demand for N-goods comes in part from the N-sector itself and (ii) there is currency
mismatch. The decline in demand for N-goods, generated by the reduction in N-
sector investment (It), leads to a fall in the relative price of N-goods pt (i.e., a
real depreciation) so that the N-market clears. Since N-ﬁr m sh a v ed o l l a rd e b to n
the books, the real depreciation induces a fall in N-sector’s proﬁts and net worth.
A vicious circle ensues as lower net worth leads to even lower investment, which
in turn leads to a greater real depreciation and so on. This is the ‘balance sheet
eﬀect’ that ampliﬁes the direct eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h es p r e a d( ρt−r) on credit
(bt) and the real value of N-output (ptqn
t ).
Since T-sector agents have access to international capital markets and r is
unchanged, T-sector production is not directly aﬀected by the increase in the
spread. Thus, both the N-to-T output ratio (ptqn
t /qtr




Notice that the comovements along the transition path are consistent with
those we documented in Section 2. An increase in the spread is associated with
a fall in credit, the N-to-T output ratio and GDP growth. Furthermore, if the
productivity parameter θ is not too big, there is also a real depreciation along the
transition path. Notice that since domestic credit is allocated to credit constrained
N-ﬁrms, and their net worth falls together with ptqn
t , GDP growth falls by less
than credit growth.
Another important implication is that the ampliﬁcation mechanism is at work
not only during the time that the shock occurs. It also reduces the steady state
value of bt and ptqn
t via (4.4). This implies that the balance sheet eﬀect ampliﬁes
both the impact and the cumulative eﬀects of a shock to the spread.
Two comments are in order. First, for the ampliﬁcation mechanism to work it
is essential that the economy be in an RSE. If there were no currency mismatch,
demand risk would not be translated into insolvency risk. As a result, borrowers
would never become insolvent, and shocks to the subsidy implicit in the guarantee
would not aﬀect the interest borrowers have to pay. Second, in an RSE the fall in
gt does not lead to a crisis: in equilibrium the real depreciation is not large enough
so as to bankrupt N-ﬁrms. This is important because we are characterizing high
20In an extended model qtr
t might increase if the decline in ptqn
t comes about through a decline
in pt, and N-goods are used in the production of T-goods.
21frequency (quarterly) ﬂuctuations, not low frequency boom-bust cycles. Recall
that in the model, crises can be caused only by demand shocks, and that these
shocks must be rare events for an RSE to exist.
4. Structural VARs
Here we derive a set of structural VARs that link the spread to output, and take
them to the data. Structural VARs can be derived directly from Proposition 3.2
because in an RSE the key variables follow a recursive autoregressive system. This
will allow us to: (i) determine which variables can be included in a VAR; and (ii)
identify the eﬀects of structural s h o c k si nt h eV A R sw er u n .
We estimate four diﬀerent VARs. One includes the spread, GDP and credit.
The reaction of GDP and credit to the spread will illustrate the strength of the
credit channel. In the second VAR we will include the N-to-T output ratio instead
of GDP in order to see whether sectorial asymmetries play a signiﬁcant role in
the amplifying mechanism. The remaining two VARs are similar to the ﬁrst
two, except that we include the real exchange rate instead of credit to determine
whether there is evidence of a balance sheet eﬀect.
In choosing these speciﬁcations, we are mindful of the fact that MICs have in
common the existence of systemic guarantees and of an asymmetry in ﬁnancing
opportunities. However, there is a wide variation across MICs in exchange rate
regimes and in the prevalence of nominal rigidities. It was thus important that the
VARs be robust to these institutional diﬀerences in order for them to apply across
t h es e to fM I C s .A na t t r a c t i v ep r o p e r t yo ft h eR S Ei st h a ti ti sc h a r a c t e r i z e db y
variables for which the equilibrium values are independent of the exchange rate
regime.
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we derive the structural VARs from Proposition 3.2.
In subsection 4.3 we present the estimation results. Lastly, in subsection 4.4 we
simulate the model, and show that the reactions of GDP and credit to a shock to
the spread resemble the reactions found in the data.
4.1. The Average Equilibrium Path
In our model economy there are two types of shocks: to the expected generosity
of the guarantee (gt) and to demand (dt). The former are high frequency shocks
(quarterly) that induce movements in the spread, while the latter are low fre-
quency shocks (periods of several years) that introduce the possibility of crises in
22equilibrium. Recall that infrequent d shocks are necessary for currency mismatch
to arise in equilibrium. Too few or too many d shocks and the balance sheet eﬀect
would not exist. Rather than setting d shocks to zero, we will derive the VARs
by computing the mean equilibrium response to a g shock with respect to the
probability distribution of d shocks.21
Computing the average equilibrium path can, in principle, be cumbersome. An
attractive feature of the RSE of Proposition 3.2 is that the probability of crisis
equals a constant 1 − α regardless of the number of crises that have occurred in
the past.22 Since we do not need to keep track of history, we can derive a simple
VAR representation of the average equilibrium path followed by the key variables.
We consider ﬁrst the interest rate spread: ρt −r. During normal times, as well as
during a crisis, t h es p r e a di sd e t e r m i n e db y( 3 . 1 1 ) .T h u s ,i na nR S Et h ea v e r a g e





α +( 1− α)gt
. (4.1)
T h es p r e a da tt i m et depends only on the generosity guarantee that is expected
to be granted at t +1 .
Since in an RSE crises occur with probability α, it follows from (3.15) and
(3.17) that the average path of credit is ˜ bt =[ α¯ wt +[1−α]wt][µt −1]. In order to
derive a dynamic system that can be estimated with observable data, we need to
substitute away net worth ( ¯ wt and wt). We do this by using (3.17) and (3.19).23









− α[1 − c]
¸¾
(4.2)
Average real GDP and the N-to-T output ratio are given by ˜ pt˜ qn
t +qtr
t and ˜ pt˜ qn
t /qtr
t ,
21In order to compute the equilibrium responses it would be easier to simply look at the path
along which crises (and d shocks) are assumed away. Unfortunately, this is not possible because
it is precisely the expectation of a crisis what is necessary to induce agents to choose risky dollar
debt. Risky debt is, in turn, necessary for our amplifying mechanism to work, and for shocks to
gt to induce movements in the interest rate spread.
22Condition (3.19) is key for this result.
23In an RSE the debt burden equals bt−1[1 + ρt−1]=α−1hµt−1wt−1. It then follows from
(3.19) that µtat = ωbt−1[1 + ρt−1]. Equation (4.2) follows directly.
24Since an RSE exists only if α is large and ηt < 1, ˜ bt is strictly decreasing in the interest rate
ρt provided we set ω ∈ (0,1) large enough, which we are free to do.




˜ bt + αd, it follows that
G ˜ DPt =
µt
µt − 1
˜ bt + αd + q
tr










Note that the exogeneity of qtr
t reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h eT - s e c t o rc a nﬁnance
itself in world markets. T-sector investment and output are therefore not directly
aﬀected by high frequency shocks to the domestic interest rate (ρt) that leave the
T-sector agents’ cost of funds unchanged.25
4.2. Identifying Structural Shocks
Here, we ask which variables to include in the VARs and how to structurally
identify the eﬀects of shocks. Proposition 3.2 imposes unambiguous restrictions
on the variables that can be included in a structural VAR. Given (wt−1,ρ t−1,ρ t),
the equilibrium values of bt,p tqn
t , and wt are linearly dependent. Thus, at most one
of these three variables can be included in a VAR. It follows that the eﬀect of the
spread on output can be empirically speciﬁed in a three variable VAR consisting
of: (i) ρt − r, (ii) either bt or ptqn
t , b u tn o tb o t h ;a n d( i i i )e i t h e rGDPt or N/Tt,
but not both.
As mentioned above, none of the variables included in the VAR are aﬀected
b yt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e . T h es p r e a d( ρt − r) is a function of the expected
generosity of the guarantee. The output measures, GDPt and N/Tt, depend on
T-output (qtr
t ) and the value of N-output (ptqn
t ). Credit (bt) and ptqn
t depend on
net worth and the spread.
To derive the VARs we will consider deviations from the ’lucky’ steady state.
T h en e tw o r t h ’ sl u c k ys t e a d ys t a t ei st h ev a l u et ow h i c hwt c o n v e r g e sa l o n gap a t h
in which no crises occur and the guarantee rate is constant (g). It follows from






Since η(g) < 1, this steady state is stable.26 The levels of bt and ptqn
t are deter-
25There might an indirect eﬀect through pt.
26T os e et h i sn o t et h a twt in (3.17) converges to a steady state along the lucky path if and
only if
ηhα−1
1−η < 1. This condition is equivalent to η< 1
1+α−1h < 1.
24mined by plugging (4.4) into (3.15) and (3.16).
Consider an economy that is initially in a lucky steady state associated with
an expected guarantee g,a n ds u p p o s et h a ta tt i m et it jumps to gt = g + ug,t.
In order for the impulse responses to make sense, and for them to capture both
tranquil time and crisis time reactions, it is necessary that: (i)an RSE exists for
all possible values of the shock ug,t, and (ii)shocks to gt alone do not lead to crisis.
Proposition 3.1 implies that an RSE exists only if gt is large enough to ensure
that the expected payoﬀ associated with dollar debt is greater than or equal to
that associated with peso debt (i.e., Πr
t+1(gt) ≥ Πs
t+1 for all t). T h u s ,f o r( i )i ti s
necessary to restrict the support of the shock: ug,t ∈ [¯ u,−¯ u],w h e r e








That is, gt can take values on [g,1]. Requirement (ii) is ensured by the condition
ηt < 1.27
Identiﬁcation
A central problem in tracing the eﬀects of a shock on the other variables is
that VAR residuals are contemporaneously correlated. Thus, in order to uncover
the structural shocks from the residuals of the reduced form estimation, we need
identifying restrictions. A remarkable feature of the RSE is that it implies that
the VARs we consider all have lower triangular structures, enabling us to recover
the structural shocks.28
To structurally identify the VARs we use (4.1)-(4.3) to trace out the eﬀects
of a shock to gt. Here, we will focus on the VAR that includes bt and GDPt.
Analogous arguments apply to the other VARs. First, since in an RSE the spread
is aﬀected only by gt,as h o c kt ogt can be viewed as a shock to the spread,
ρt − r. Second, since the cash-ﬂow (ηt) and investment (µt) multipliers are given
by ηt =[ 1− c]µt = 1−c
1−hα−1[1+ρt]−1, it follows from (4.2) that average credit is
contemporaneously aﬀected only by the spread, through µt and ηt. Lastly, (4.3)
implies that GDP and the N-to-T ratio are contemporaneously aﬀected both by
27To see this suppose that gt =0and dt = d, so that p
t = mtwt+d
qt . One can verify that at
this low price π(p
t) is positive.
28An alternative approach for achieving identiﬁcation is to place restrictions on the long run
behavior of the variables or estimating the response functions of central banks to shocks in
output.
25shocks to credit and to the spread (through µt). Put slightly diﬀerently, (4.1)-(4.3)
imply the following log-linear representation of the average responses to a shock
in gt:29























where a hat denotes logarithm. In practice, we cannot estimate this structural
model directly. Instead, we estimate a reduced form.30 For this reduced form to
be structurally identiﬁed, it is necessary that the matrix e A0 is lower triangular.31
The lower triangular structure of e A0 determines the VAR ordering (ρt −
r,bt,GDP t) and allows us to compute impulse response functions that are struc-
turally identiﬁed. Again, the key point is that this ordering follows directly from
the model, as ρt − r is only aﬀected by shocks to gt, bt is contemporaneously
aﬀected only by the spread, while GDPt (or N/Tt) is aﬀected by the other two
variables in the same period.
29The structural residuals ut are by assumption uncorrelated and have zero mean: E(ut)=0
and E(ut,u0
t)=e ∆,w h e r e˜ ∆ is a matrix with the variances of the shocks on the main diagonal
and zero elements otherwise. Notice that uρ−r,t reﬂe c t ss h o c k st og, ub,t can reﬂect shocks to c
or ω, and uq,t can reﬂect shocks to qtr
t .
30These equations can be viewed as a restricted version of the following more general system
of equations: e A0Yt = e A1Yt−1 +...+ e AjYt−j +ut. We estimate the following reduced form of the
model:
Yt = e A
−1
0 e A1Yt−1 + ... + e A
−1
0 e ApYt−p + e A
−1
0 ut
= A1Yt−1 + ... + ApYt−p + εt, where Ai = e A
−1
0 e A1.
31The relationship between the structural residuals ut and the reduced form residuals εt
from the estimated regression equation is: εt = e A
−1







0 )=E( e A
−1
0 e D e A
−10
0 )=Ω. As Ω is symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite, we can
use a Choleski decomposition to uncover the structural residuals from the estimated reduced
form residuals. This is because for any symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite matrix Ω,t h e r e
exists a triangular Matrix C, with ones on the main diagonal, such that Ω = CDC0. In our case
D = e D and C = e A
−1
0 .
26Notice that the ordering of the variables is diﬀerent than in the literature,
where the interest rate and the spread are typically placed in the last position
of the VAR. The rationale for this ordering is that if the central bank has full
control over short-term rates, it can immediately adjust them in response to an
output shock. Thus, interest rates can be contemporaneously aﬀected by output in
q u a r t e r l yd a t a .W h i l et h i sm i g h tbet h ec a s ei nc o u n t r i e ss u c ha st h eU S ,i ti sn o ts o
in MICs. In MICs, standard monetary instruments, like open market operations,
have little leeway in aﬀecting the interest rates that determine investment. Thus,
output does not have a contemporaneous eﬀect on the spread.32
In MICs, shocks to the spread ρt −r are more appropriately viewed as shocks
to agents’ expectations about the willingness and the ability of the government
to guarantee loans. These, in turn, are determined by, among other things, the
ﬁscal stance of the government, its access to international credit lines, and the
willingness of politicians to grant bailouts.33
4.3. Impulse Response Functions
We estimate the VARs in ﬁrst diﬀerences using quarterly data for 8 MICs (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru, Thailand and Turkey) and the G3
countries (Germany, Japan and the United States), and compute the impulse re-
sponse functions corresponding to a shock to the spread.34 We include two lags
and a time trend in the estimation. As we reject the null of cointegration among
the variables after ﬁnite sample adjustment, we do not include an error correction
term.35 In order to represent the impulse response functions in a visually illustra-
tive way, we show the grouped impulse response functions that show the average
behavior of the 8 countries —a representation also used in Bekaert and Campbell
(2001).
32In the literature for high income countries, the ordering is not uncontroversial. For instance,
Sims (1980) orders the interest rate in the ﬁrst position of the VAR.
33Brazil in the year 2002 exempliﬁes this situation. The increase in the likelihood that a leftist
candidate might win the Presidential elections lead to skyrocketing interest rates. The bailout
program announced by the IMF in August lead to a reduction in the premium. Unfortunately
this lasted only a few days.
34The selection of countries is determined by the availability of quarterly data, in particular
at the sectorial level. We have included countries for which we have at least 7 years of quarterly
data for all variables. Note that the length of the VAR is not the same across countries. See
the Appendix for variable deﬁnitions and data sources.
35A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁnite sample critical values reported in Cheung and Lai (1993).
27VAR I: (ρt − r,bt,GDP t)
This VAR addresses the existence and strength of the credit channel. Figure
4.1 traces the cumulative response of GDP and credit to a one-standard devia-
tion shock in the spread. Shown are four cumulative impulse response functions
corresponding to: an average of the 8 MICs, an average of the G3, Mexico and
the US.
We can see that in the group of 8 MICs both variables respond negatively
to the shock. By contrast, in the G3 the responses are an order of magnitude
smaller, although they have the same sign. Panel (c) shows the point estimates
and standard errors for the cases of Mexico and the United States. Here again,
we see that the response in Mexico is much larger than in the US. Furthermore,
the responses in Mexico are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the ones in the US
are not.36,37
36Note that although we do not report standard errors, the responses of the group of 8 MICs
are statistically highly signiﬁcant. As we have an average of 8 countries, the standard errors
of the individual countries would have to be divided by
√
8 to evaluate the signiﬁcance level.
Thus, even if the point estimates were smaller than the standard errors individually, the grouped
impulse responses would still be signiﬁcant.
37As an alternative we could have included dummies to capture an increase in the spread due
to a crisis. If we were to do so, the main results would not change. Although the eﬀect during
crisis times is stronger, the total cumulative eﬀect is only a bit smaller if the dummy is included
(23% in the case of Mexico).
28Figure 4.1: VAR I: (ρt − r,bt,GDP t)
Panel (a): Middle Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 8 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs  including the spread, credit and GDP. Each VAR is estimated
from quarterly data in growth rates, allowing for 2 lags and  a time trend.
Panel (b): High Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 3 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.























29Panel (c): Mexico vs. USA 
 





































Note: The lines trace the accumulated response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock. 
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs, specified as in panel (a). Finite sample critical values are 
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This result establishes the ﬁrst of our main empirical ﬁndings, that the credit
channel is strong in MICs: GDP reacts strongly to the interest rate spread. It
also provides a hint as to the amplifying mechanism, as credit also reacts strongly
to the spread. In fact, it reacts more strongly than GDP. This observation is
consistent with any model with a ﬁnancial accelerator. However, at this point, we
cannot discern any speciﬁc amplifying mechanism. The next group of VARs will
help us uncover the mechanism that generates the strong credit channel.
30Figure 4.2: VAR II: (ρt − r,bt,p tqn
t /qtr
t )
Panel (a): Middle Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 8 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs  including the spread, credit and N/T. Each VAR is estimated
from quarterly data in growth rates, allowing for 2 lags and  a time trend.
Panel (b): High Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 3 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
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Note: The lines trace the accumulated response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock. 
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs, specified as in panel (a). Finite sample critical values are 
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VAR II: (ρt − r,bt,p tqn
t /qtr
t ).
This VAR allows us to analyze the credit channel from a diﬀerent angle, and
see whether sectorial asymmetries play a signiﬁcant role in the amplifying mech-
anism. It will permit us to discriminate between our model and other possible
mechanisms. Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 shows that in MICs there is indeed a striking
asymmetry in the response of the N and T sectors. In response to a positive
shock in the spread, credit and the N-to-T output ratio decline. Panel (b) shows
that this amplifying mechanism is indeed a phenomenon particular to MICs, as
we do not see a similar pattern in the G3. Panel (c) shows the impulse response
functions for Mexico and the US. Here again, the reaction of credit and N/T are
statistically signiﬁcant in Mexico, but not in the USA.
32T h ef a c tt h a tc r e d i ta n dt h eN - t o - To u t p u tr a t i of a l li nr e s p o n s et ot h es h o c k
indicates that the N-Sector is more credit constrained than the T-Sector. In fact,
the same conclusion can be drawn from VAR I as credit falls more than GDP. The
negative GDP response is driven mainly by the decline in the N-Sector, while the
T-sector is either only mildly aﬀected or responds positively to the spread.
Combining these two results establishes our second main ﬁnding, that an asym-
metry in sectorial responses is a key element of the amplifying mechanism. Any
model that aims to explain the strength of the credit channel in MICs needs also to
explain the striking asymmetry in sectorial responses. In the mechanism we pro-
pose it is caused by an asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities, which also explains
the strength of the credit response relative to that of GDP.
VARs III : (ρt − r, 1/pt,GDP t)a n d( ρt − r,1/pt,N/T t).
E s t i m a t i n gV A R st h a ti n c l u d et h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e( 1/pt) allows us to an-
alyze more directly the role played by the balance sheet eﬀect in amplifying the
direct eﬀect of the spread on output. Can one derive such VARs from Propo-
sition 3.2? Should credit also be included? What is the correct ordering? Re-
call that an RSE can be characterized in terms of either (wt−1,ρ t−1,ρ t,b t) or
(wt−1,ρ t−1,ρ t,p tqn
t ). Furthermore, since in the model N-output is determined by
past investment (qn
t = θIt−1), the contemporaneous response of pt i st h es a m ea s
that of ptqn
t . Given this identiﬁcation restriction, Proposition 3.2 implies that we
should substitute the real exchange rate (1/pt)f o rc r e d i t( bt)i nV A R sIa n dI I .
Empirically, we are assuming that N-output is predetermined in a given quarter.
Figure 4.3 exhibits the cumulative impulse responses associated with the VAR
(ρt − r, 1/pt,GDP t).F o rt h eg r o u po fM I C st h e r ei sad e c l i n ei nG D Pa n dar e a l
depreciation in response to a positive shock to the spread. In the G3, however,
this response is absent. The graphs for Mexico and the U.S. replicate the same
patterns.
Figure 4.4 corresponds to a VAR that includes the N-to-T output ratio instead
of GDP. Here again we see a clear asymmetric response of the two sectors in the
group of MICs and in Mexico. However, such an asymmetry is absent in the
grouped responses of the G3 and in the US.
33Figure 4.3: VARs IIIa: (ρt − r,1/pt,GDP t)
Panel (a): Middle Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 8 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs  including the spread, 1/p and GDP. Each VAR is estimated from
quarterly data in growth rates, allowing for 2 lags and  a time trend.
Panel (b): High Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 3 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
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Note: The lines trace the accumulated response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock. 
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs, specified as in panel (a). Finite sample critical values are 
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We take the signiﬁcant real depreciation in response to an increase in the spread
as an indication that currency mismatch is a key ingredient of the amplifying
mechanism. The balance sheet eﬀect is at work: after the initial decline in N-
investment, the real depreciation reduces the net worth of N-agents with dollar
debt on the books. This reduction allows them to invest even less, and so on. Of
course, we are not ruling out alternative mechanisms, but are not aware of any
that are consistent with all of these facts.
35Figure 4.4: VARs IIIb: (ρt − r,1/pt,N/T t)
Panel (a): Middle Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 8 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs  including the spread, 1/p and N/T. Each VAR is estimated from
quarterly data in growth rates, allowing for 2 lags and  a time trend.
Panel (b): High Income Countries
Note: The lines trace the accumulated average response of 3 countries to a one-standard deviation shock.






























36Panel (c): Mexico vs. USA 
 
 




































Note: The lines trace the accumulated response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock. 
Calculations are based on three-variable VARs, specified as in panel (a). Finite sample critical values are 
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4.4. Simulation of the Model
We now contrast the VAR impulse responses to a simulation of the average re-
sponse of our model economy along the equilibrium path (4.1)-(4.3).
To simulate the model we need to choose the value of eight parameters (α,r,c,h,d,g,θ,ω),
and the initial conditions (w0,q 0). First, α and r come from the data. In the panel
of 39 MICs studied by Tornell and Westermann (2002) the probability of crisis
in a given period is 0.05. Thus, we set α =0 .95. We set the world interest rate r
equal to the average US interest rate over the period 1980:1 to 1999:4, which is
equal to 0.075. Second, we choose c, ω, d and h so that the restrictions necessary


















t+1 (g =0 .75). Forth, productivity parameter θ determines
how an increase in the real value of N-output ptqn
t is translated into changes in
pt and qn
t . We set θ =2so that pt is increasing. Lastly, the values of (w0,q 0)
are neither critical for the existence of an RSE, nor determine the shape of the
impulse responses.
Figure 4.5 shows the reaction of GDP and bt t oan e g a t i v es h o c kt ogt (it
declines from 0.75 to 0.6, which is equivalent to an increase in ρt from 0.088 to
0.096). As the ﬁgure shows, the reaction patterns in the model and in the data
look strikingly similar.38
The existence of an RSE and the simulated impulse responses are robust to
alternative choices of the parameters. For instance, given all other parameter
choices, ((3.10), (3.19) and (3.20)) are satisﬁed for any h ∈ (0,.35) and any
c ∈ (.55,1). Furthermore, g can be set anywhere from 0.06 to 1.
38The ﬁg u r ed i s p l a y st h ee v e np e r i o d so ft h er e s p o n s e . D u et ot h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on
wt−1, the system oscillates towards the new steady state. This is a particularity of the discrete
nature of the model. It would not arise in a continuos time setup.
38Table 5.1: Sectorial and Size Distributions of Firms
N-Sector T-Sector
Small 68 % 32 %
Large 33 % 67 %
Source: World Business Environment Survey (WBES),
2001.
Note: “small” corresponds to firms with up to 200
employees.
5. Credit Market Imperfections
Here we present evidence on the two key distortions that underlie the ampliﬁcation
mechanism: systemic guarantees and asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities.39
Asymmetric Financing Opportunities Across Sectors
We use ﬁrm level data from a panel of 3877 ﬁrms of the World Business
Economic Survey of the World Bank (WBES, 2001). It covers 27 out of our
sample of 39 MICs.40 The survey classiﬁes ﬁrms according to their size and,
among other things, ﬁrms were asked whether or not they export. Since the share
of T-output in the group of export ﬁrms is greater than that of non-export ﬁrms,
we identify exporters with T-sector ﬁrms and non-exporters with N-sector ﬁrms.
Using this classiﬁcation we can see in Table 5.1 that a majority (68 percent) of
small and medium ﬁrms belongs to the N-sector, while a majority (67 percent) of
large ﬁrms belongs to the T-sector.41
Firms were also asked to rank, on a scale from 1 to 4, how much of an obstacle
ﬁnancing was to running their business. We use the answers from this survey to
estimate an ordered probit model to assess whether there exists an asymmetry in
39In a previous version, we present evidence on the existence of currency mismatch. It is
available from the authors upon request.
40Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia,
Lithuania, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela. Schiﬀer
and Weder (2001) describe in detail this data base. It is available from the World Bank at:
http://www.worldbank.org/beext/resources/assess-wbessurvey-alt.htm
41There are some large ﬁrms in the N-sector, such as utilities. However, in most countries
they represent a small share of the N-sector ﬁrms in the survey.
39ﬁnancing opportunities across the N and T-sectors.42,43
We create a dummy variable for the yes-or-no answer “do you export?” A
signiﬁcant positive parameter on the dummy indicates that N-sector ﬁrms evaluate
the access to ﬁnance as a signiﬁcantly larger obstacle to running their business
than T-sector ﬁrms do. Table 5.2 reports the regression results: regression 1 is
the basic regression where we regress the perceived credit constraints on the N-
sector dummy. Regression 2 replaces the N-Sector by a variable that measures
the percentage of output that is exported among exporters. Regression 3 reports
the results of a regression that diﬀerentiates between small and large N-ﬁrms, and
includes the age of the ﬁrm and the share of government participation as control
variables.
In all regressions we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between exporters
and non-exporters in their evaluation of ﬁnancing as an obstacle for running their
businesses. The latter evaluate the obstacle to be more severe. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that among exporters, the larger the share of exports in output, the less
signiﬁcant is ﬁnancing deemed to be as an obstacle for running a business. We
also ﬁnd that older ﬁrms have easier access to ﬁnancing than younger ﬁrms. The
same is true for ﬁrms with a high government participation. None of the control
variables, however, obviates the role of the exporters/non-exporters indicator.
42We estimate ordered probit regressions of the following form.
y∗
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n =2 7 , and EXPORT is either a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm does not export,
or it is the share exports in output among exporting ﬁrms. GOV controls for government
participation in the ﬁrm, AGE denotes the year a ﬁrm was established and d1...dn are country
dummies. The dependent variable, y, captures the ranking of the severity of an obstacle for
running a business, as perceived by the ﬁrms. The obstacles considered are ﬁnancing, collateral
and the exchange rate. The true y is not directly observed and the α parameters are estimated
together with β0...β3 and γ1...γn.
43We use the same approach as Schiﬀer and Weder (2001), who compare small and large ﬁrms
with respect to ﬁnancing constraints as well as other indicators of governance. They ﬁnd that
small ﬁrms are more constrained.
40Table 5.2: Asymmetric Financing Opportunities
 
Dependent variable: Answer to the question 
“is financing a major obstacle to running your business?” 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
N-sector firms  0.175*** 
(0.039) 
  
Share of exports    -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
NL     0.265*** 
(0.051) 
NS     0.094* 
(0.053) 
Age     -0.000 
(0.001) 
Government share     -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Note: This table reports regression results of ordered probit regressions, 
specified with a constant and with country dummies. The answer to the 
question “is financing a major obstacle to running your business?” is 
evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4. The independent variable in regressions 1 
and 3 is a dummy that is equal to one for N sector firms and zero otherwise. 
In regression 2, it is the share of exports among T-sector firms. In regression 
3, NL = Non tradable and large, NS = Non tradable and small, the age of the 
firm, and the share of government participation. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level and *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level. 
41Systemic guarantees
Despite the fact that bailout guarantees have played an important role in sev-
eral explanations of crises, the evidence supporting the existence of this distortion
is mainly anecdotal. Although many countries have systemic guarantees in place,
it is very diﬃcult to document their existence directly. The diﬃculty in pinning
guarantees down is that in most cases they are implicit. To begin with, they are
not limited to promises to hand out a bailout payment to lenders in case of default.
In most cases they are implicit in the exchange rate regime and monetary policy
rules. Since in most instances one of the objectives of policymakers is to avoid
sharp drops in output, they will implement policies that are, de facto, implicit
guarantees against systemic crises.44
The question arises as to how to establish the existence of implicit guarantees.
We address this question by looking at the behavior of interest rate spreads.
The idea is that if guarantees are present, the spread will, ceteris paribus, be
insensitive to a deterioration in the average quality of loans, assuming, of course,
that no crisis has yet occurred. When a crisis occurs, the quality of loans collapses
and the spread skyrockets.
An ideal way to measure the evolution of the loans’ quality is with the ‘true’
share of non-performing loans (NPLs). Unfortunately, such data in time series
form does not exist for most MICs. A good proxy for an increase in NPLs is
the occurrence of a lending boom in the recent past. When there is a sharp
acceleration in credit, the monitoring capacity of both banks and regulators is
diminished, so that there is an increase in the likelihood of granting credit to bad
projects. The increase in the share of NPLs may take some time to materialize
because it takes time for a given loan to become non-performing and because
during the boom a lot of new loans are being granted. Nonetheless, after some
time NPLs must become a problem for the banking system. This is true regardless
of whether NPLs are oﬃcially recorded. To capture this idea we run the following
panel regression
(ρ − r)j,t = αj + α1LBj,t−1 + α2Dj,t · LBj,t−1 + εj,t, (5.1)
where (ρ − r)j,t is the interest rate spread as deﬁned earlier, in country j at time
t. LBj,t−1 is a dummy that indicates the existence of a lending boom. It is equal
to one if during the past 2 years real credit has grown by more than 10% on
44Systemic guarantees are not the same as deposit insurance schemes, which cover individual
agents against idiosyncratic risk.
42Table 5.3: Implicit Bailout Guarantees
 
Dependent variable: Interest rate spread 
 
  (a) MIC 8  (b) Group of 39 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LB j,t-1 2.559***  1.330 0.723** -0.188 
 (0.930)  (0.875)  (0.348)  (0.485) 
Dj,t*LB j,t-1  3.849***  2.833*** 
   (1.131)  (1.007) 
Adj. R
2  0.531 0.636 0.631 0.634 
N  74 74  244  244 
 
Note: The table shows the estimates of the panel regression in (5.1). 
The lending boom dummy, LB, is equal to one, if the growth rate of 
real credit has been larger than 10 percent on average for the past two 
years. The crisis dummy, D, indicates that a twin crisis occurred in t or 
t+1. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects, using a GLS 
estimator.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
average. Dj,t is a dummy that indicates that twin banking and currency crises
have occurred at t or t − 1.
The coeﬃcient α1 measures the eﬀect of an increase in NPLs on the spread
in country-years in which a crisis has not occurred in either the current or the
previous year. Meanwhile, the sum α1 + α2 measures the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
NPLs on the spread during crisis times (at t or t − 1). As we discussed above, in
order to isolate the eﬀect of guarantees we need to distinguish between periods in
which a crisis has not occurred recently, and periods where a crisis has occurred
recently. This is because systemic crises are typically preceded by lending booms
and during crises the spread shoots up.
T h en u l lh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h e r ea r es y s t e m i cg u a r a n t e e si sH0 : α1 =0 . Table
5.3 exhibits the estimates of regression (5.1). Panel (a) considers the set of 8 MICs
used in the VARs, while panel (b) considers the 39 MICs. In both cases we cannot
r e j e c tt h en u l la tt h e1 0 %s i g n i ﬁcance level. That is, we cannot reject the presence
of systemic guarantees. Interestingly, if the crisis dummy is disregarded and the
spread is regressed only on the lending boom dummy, the estimated coeﬃcient is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.45
45If we were to deﬁne systemic guarantees literally as promises to hand out a bailout payment
43Currency Mismatch and Banks Exposure to the N-sector
Currency mismatch (CM) exits when liabilities are denominated in foreign
currency, while the income streams that must service these debts are denominated
in domestic currency. CM has become an important issue in MICs because sudden
real depreciations increase signiﬁc a n t l yt h ed e b tb u r d e no fal a r g eg r o u po fa g e n t s ,
generating a meltdown of the banking system.
Unfortunately, there are no readily available indices of CM, so the question
arises as to how best to measure this concept. First of all, CM need not be a
problem that aﬀects the aggregate economy. It is a sectorial problem that mainly
aﬀects the N-sector. It may well be the case that there is enough foreign currency
available to service the debt. However, if N-sector debtors and the banks that lend
to them have CM, then a real depreciation might generate a meltdown, unless the
government can implement a redistribution from the T to the N-sector on short
notice. Clearly, these ﬁscal transfers are not feasible.
Since in MICs banks are heavily exposed to the N-sector, we can get a more
precise indicator of CM by looking at the balance sheet of the banking system.
Table 5.4 shows that, on average, only about a third of bank lending goes to
ﬁrms that can potentially be classiﬁed as belonging to the tradeable sector. This
indicates that the banking system is strongly exposed to the N-sector.46
S i n c eb a n k sa r es t r o n g l ye x p o s e dt ot h eN - s e c t o rw ec a n n o td e t e r m i n et h e
degree of CM by simply comparing the liabilities and the assets of the banking
system. A bank can have 20% of its liabilities in dollars and 20% of its assets
denominated in dollars. However, if all the loans are granted to the N-sector,
there is a de facto CM because there is insolvency risk. It may be even more
misleading just to compare the denomination of deposits and loans, as these are
to lenders in case of default, we could investigate the proportion of crises that have triggered this
type of bailouts, and then impose rational expectations to infer the ex-ante implicit guarantee.
Bordo and Schwarz (2001) and Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2000) ﬁnd evidence of ex-post bailouts
during the last two decades and the early banking crises of the 20th century.
46In order to bias the results against the hypothesis that banks are heavily exposed to the
N - s e c t o r ,w ea s s u m et h a ta l lﬁrms in sectors that are commonly considered tradable are indeed
tradable. Thus, we group manufacturing, mining, agriculture, forestry, and primary produc-
tion as tradables, while construction, services, electricity-gas-water are considered nontradables.
Note that the fraction of bank lending that goes to consumption or housing credit is not covered
by foreign currency income and thus also counts as non-tradable. In most countries, the ﬁgures
would be even higher if these items where included (consumption and housing credit are only
available for Hungary, Mexico and Thailand).
44Table 5.4: Bank Lending by Sector
 
 Assets 






Argentina (95)  67.1
3 32.9 
Chile (85)  60.1  39.9 
Korea (97)  74.8
5 25.1 
Mexico (95)  66.0  33.9 
Peru (96)  59.2  40.8 
Thailand (97)  66.5  34.5 
Turkey (93)  34.0
4 66.0 
 
Sources:  See appendix.  
 
Notes: 1) N-Sectors: Construction, Real Estate Business, 
Infrastructure, Services, Personal Consumption, Commerce, 
Wholesale and Retail, Housing, Electricity-Gas-Water, 
Restaurants, Hotels, Transportation, Small firms. 2) T- 
Sectors: Mining, Quarrying, Industry, Agriculture, Forestry; 
Industrial Sector, Foreign entities, Primary Production, 
Imports, trade, Large, Other 3) including consumption or 
Housing credit. 4) only consumption credit is N 5) N is 
proxied by small, T is proxied by large firms. 
only a subset, and a small subset at that, of the total balance sheet.47
Our index of CM compares the share of foreign currency liabilities of the
banking system to the share of loans that are covered by export income. We
compute the latter ratio by multiplying the share of bank lending that goes to the
T-sector by the share of T-sector output that is actually exported. Column (c)
in Table 5.5 shows that exporting ﬁrms sell the majority of their output in the
domestic market. Thus, they too must earmark a large share of domestic currency
revenue for servicing foreign currency debt.
Our index of CM is reported in column (e) of Table 5.5. The estimates range
from 2.97 for Korea in 1997 to 4.34 for Mexico in 1995.48 To see that CM is
mostly a sectorial, not an aggregate, problem compare Table 5.5 with Table 5.6.
47For instance, foreign currency deposits in Thailand account for less than 10% of the total
foreign external liabilities of the banking system.
48Our estimates of CM are conservative. More realistic/accurate estimates would take into
account that the amount of foreign currency revenue that is available to service debt is less than
total foreign currency income. Some of the foreign currency income is required to pay oﬀ the
factors of production.
45Table 5.5: Share of foreign currency liabilities covered by income from exports
 
 Liabilities  Assets  Foreign  currency 
coverage of assets 
Currency 
Mismatch 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 







(b)*(c) (a)/(d)  , 
(lower bound
3) 
Argentina (95)  35.0  32.9  0.30  9.8  3.57 
Chile (83)  46.7  39.9
1 0.28  11.2  4.17 
Korea (97)  17.9
2 25.1  0.34  8.53  2.97 
Mexico (95)  33.4  33.9  0.23  7.7  4.34 
Peru (96)  73.0  59.2  0.34  20.1  3.62 
Thailand (97)  22.3  34.5  0.17  5.8  3.85 
Turkey (93)  47.0  66.0  0.24  15.84  2.97 
 
Sources: see appendix. 
 
Note. 1) Data on loans in Chile are from 1985 2) Foreign liabilities data in Korea is from 
1993 – thus currency mismatch in 97 must have been much larger. 3) The results are biased 
against finding our hypothesis of currency mismatch in several important ways 1) Off 
balance sheet items are not included, which are primarily in foreign currency. 2) Due to 
legislation Banks tend to underreport their foreign currency holdings as a share of liabilities 
(see Kamin et. al 2001) 3) We assume that all revenues from exports can be used to service 
the debt. All firms in potentially tradable sectors are assumed to indeed be tradable. 











Source: World Bank Development indicators (year: 1994)
Notice that the foreign debt service-to-exports ratio is low in countries with a high
CM index. A banking system where only 15-30% of dollars loans are covered by
exports are certainly subject to substantial real exchange rate risk. This is true
even though the aggregate measures of Table 5.6 do not indicate CM.49
6. Extensions
Here, we brieﬂy analyze how the economy responds to monetary shocks under
alternative exchange rate regimes and delve into the determinants of the spread
ρt −r i nM I C s .As i m p l ew a yt oi n t r o d u c em o n e t a r ys h o c k si st oa d dc r e d i tf r o m
the central bank to the ﬁscal authority (DCt) to money supply equation (3.7).
The money market equilibrium (Ms
t = Md












t = dt + µ(gt)wt
The second equality follows from the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate (3.1),
while the third follows from the the equilibrium value of N-output ptqn
t character-
ized in Proposition 3.2.
49A high foreign debt service-to-exports ratio signals a CM problem. However, just because
this aggregate measure may be low, one cannot infer that there is no CM.
47Consider an expansionary shock to DCt.T h e ﬁrst point to notice is that
the equilibrium demand for money (i.e., dt+µ(gt)wt) remains unchanged. This is
because in the RSE of Proposition 3.2 the DCt shock aﬀects neither the investment
multiplier (µt) nor the net worth of N-ﬁrms (wt), as can be seen in (3.13) and
(3.17).
I tf o l l o w st h a tu n d e rﬁxed exchange rates there is a decline in reserves (et∆Rt =
∆DCt), while under ﬂexible exchange rates there is a nominal devaluation (∆%et =
∆%DCt). Since et appears in the right hand side of (6.1), which must remain un-
changed in an RSE, it is necessary that ∆%(pn
t qn
t )=∆%et. This condition is
consistent with either non-tradables inﬂation (∆pn
t ) or an increase in N-output
(∆qn
t ). The particular outcome depends on the character of the nominal rigidity.
This is an important issue, but not the focus of our paper.50
A monetary shock does not aﬀect bt,p tqn
t or qtr
t b e c a u s ei ta ﬀects neither the
lending rate at which bank-dependent N-sector agents ﬁnance themselves (ρt),
nor the cost of external funds faced by T-ﬁrms (r),w h oc a nﬁnance themselves in
international ﬁnancial markets.51
T h ef a c tt h a ts h o c k st oDCt do not directly aﬀect variables such as bank credit
or investment, does not mean that monetary policy has no eﬀects in MICs. It
does aﬀect the economy through its impact on the expected generosity of systemic
guarantees (gt). Monetary policy announcements may signal the willingness of the
government to grant bailouts. Of course, it is ultimately the ﬁscal stance what
determines the ability to ﬁnance such bailouts.
7. Related Literature
T h e r ei sav a s tl i t e r a t u r eo nt h ee ﬀects of monetary shocks on output. Our
work is closely related to the subset of this literature devoted to the credit chan-
nel. Investigations into whether monetary policy aﬀects output through a credit
channel, in addition to the traditional money channel, have focused on the link
between interest rate spreads and future movements in output. This link has been
established in US data by Stock and Watson (1989), and Friedman and Kuttner
(1992). Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchist (2000) show that this link is consistent
50See, for instance, Gali and Monacelli (2002) for an analysis of monetary policy in a small
open economy with price rigidities.
51Our results are related to the equivalence of exchange rate regimes established by Helpman
(1981).
48with the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator and that the spread is an indicator of
the stance of monetary policy. However, Bernanke (1990) ﬁnds that the strength
of this link has been declining over time, and Friedman and Kuttner (1998) point
out that the spread failed to predict the 1990 recession. In related work, Kashyap
et. al. (1993) consider the mix of loans and commercial paper to investigate the
existence of the credit channel.
T h eV A R sw ed e r i v ea n de s t i m a t ea r es i m i l a rt ot h eo n e sa l l u d e dt oa b o v ea s
they link a spread with credit and output. An attractive feature of our empirical
exercise is that the impulse responses we exhibit are structurally identiﬁed by the
restrictions implied by the equilibrium of our model.
In order to uncover the propagation mechanism that underlies the credit chan-
nel, a series of papers look at the asymmetric behavior of small and large ﬁrms.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) ﬁnd that, in the manufacturing sector, small ﬁrms
react more strongly to monetary contractions than large ﬁrms. This evidence is
associated with the fact that large ﬁrms are less bank-dependent and make greater
use of equity and bonds markets. Ramey (1993) ﬁnds that the ratio of credit to
small and large ﬁrms has some eﬀect on aggregate output. Kashyap and Stein
(2000) ﬁnd that, after a contractionary monetary shock, lending of small banks
declines more strongly than that of large banks. They argue that —as with small
ﬁrms— small banks have more diﬃculty in accessing uninsured sources of funds.
The asymmetry between small and large agents is also key in MICs. However,
as we document in this paper, in MICs this asymmetry also distinguishes the N
and T sectors: small ﬁrms are mainly in the N sector, while large ﬁrms are mainly
in the T-sector. This asymmetry is the key to our ﬁnding that the N-to-T output
ratio declines signiﬁcantly in response to an increase in the spread in the second
group of VARs we run. Furthermore, this asymmetry allows us to rationalize the
important role played by real exchange rate ﬂuctuations in MICs.
There is a growing number of country studies that try to uncover the impor-
t a n c eo fc r e d i tm a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n si nMICs. See for instance Aizenmann et. al.
(1998) for Argentina, Ber et. al. (2001) for Israel and Gelos et. al. (2002) for
Mexico.
The model in this paper is closely related to Schneider and Tornell (2000).
In order to explain low frequency boom-bust cycles and self fulﬁlling twin crises,
they characterize the explosive paths of an economy with endogenous uncertainty.
In contrast, we are interested in deriving structural VARs that apply to high
frequency ﬂuctuations, and not just to crises. Thus, we consider an economy hit
by exogenous shocks and characterize the equilibrium ﬂuctuations around a steady
49state. Other papers that analyze the implications of credit market imperfections
in MICs include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999), Cespedes, Chang and
Velasco (2001), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Dekle and Kletzer (2001),
Mckinnon and Pill (1998) and Tirole (2002).
8. Conclusions
In the past, inﬂation and ﬁscal deﬁcits were the main danger facing middle in-
come countries (MICs). But in recent years, the biggest hazards have instead
been lending booms and asset-price inﬂation —or its cousin, real exchange rate
appreciation. Credit market imperfections are at the heart of these phenomena,
with sectorial asymmetries between N- and T-sectors, playing a key role in the
ampliﬁcation of shocks.
In this paper we have presented a model that helps us think about these
new hazards. The model captures the credit market imperfections prevalent in
MICs, and leads to a structural estimation framework suitable to analyze economic
ﬂuctuations in a world of liberalized ﬁnancial ﬂows, but with asymmetric ﬁnancing
opportunities across sectors.
The evidence presented here shows that, in spite of the many ways MICs are
distinct from one another, they have in common the patterns of several macro-
economic variables. In particular, an increase in the spread between domestic and
international interest rates has a strong eﬀe c to nG D Pa n da ne v e ns t r o n g e re ﬀect
on domestic credit. In addition, movements in credit are strongly correlated with
those of investment, the real exchange rate, and the ratio of nontradables (N) to
tradables (T) output.
That the relationship between these variables should be the same, irrespective
of diﬀerences in other country characteristics, suggests a common shock propa-
gation mechanism. Our ﬁndings indicate that the literature on the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator developed to explain macroeconomic patterns in high income countries
is extremely relevant to understanding economic ﬂuctuations in MICs. However,
MICs share common features that distinguish them from high income countries.
For the latter, access to external funds tends to depend on size. For MICs, the
size distinction is also a distinction between the N and T sectors, and thus real
exchange rate ﬂuctuations play a key role in the amplifying mechanism. Another
important diﬀerence is that monetary policy is far less eﬀective at altering the
interest rates that matter to investment in MICs.
50At the heart of the MIC credit channel is the interaction of two credit market
imperfections: a deep asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities across N and T sectors
and government guarantees that cover lenders against systemic default. In MICs
T-sector ﬁrms have access to international capital markets, while most N-ﬁrms
are bank-dependent and are ﬁnancially constrained. Systemic guarantees generate
incentives for borrowers to take on insolvency risk by denominating debt in foreign
currency. This currency mismatch makes movements in the real exchange rate —the
relative price between N and T goods— the driving element in the ampliﬁcation of
shocks. Any shock that increases the cost of domestic funds depresses investment
demand and generates a real depreciation, which, in turn, further depresses net
worth and investment, leading to a greater real depreciation, and so on. This
is the balance sheet eﬀect that is responsible for the credit channel’s strength in
MICs.
We have examined the balance sheet eﬀect from several diﬀerent angles. We
presented stylized facts common to MICs that are suggestive of the balance sheet
eﬀect. We have presented a model that reconciles these facts and leads to a well
speciﬁed estimation framework. The resulting VARs allowed us to structurally
identify shocks to credit market conditions and trace their eﬀects on economic
ﬂuctuations. The eﬀects we ﬁnd in the data are consistent with those generated
by a simulation of the model. Furthermore, we show that the model’s key assump-
tions are consistent with evidence gleaned from both ﬁrm level and aggregate data.
It is the combination of these diﬀerent approaches that gives us conﬁdence in the
robustness of our conclusions. Of course, we are not ruling out alternative mech-
anisms, but are not aware of any that is capable of explaining simultaneously all
o ft h er e g u l a r i t i e sw eh a v ed o c u m e n t e d .
An implication of our work is that sectorial indicators may be as crucial as
aggregate ones for understanding MIC performance. Currency mismatch is not
a problem because it jeopardizes a country’s ability to repay debt in the event
of a real depreciation. Rather, it is a problem because, in the absence of ﬁscal
transfers from T-sector ﬁrms, it imperils N-sector borrowers and their creditors.
Real exchange rate ﬂuctuations may not primarily reﬂect changes in the relative
price of domestic and foreign tradable goods, but instead sectorial imbalances.
Robust increases in aggregate output driven by T-ﬁrms may hide a languishing
domestic sector, raising the prospect of future bottlenecks choking oﬀ growth.
I tf o l l o w st h a ti naw o r l do fﬁnancial liberalization and of asymmetries in
ﬁnancing opportunities across N- and T-sectors, low inﬂation is not a guarantee
of economic stability. If the balance sheet eﬀect is at work, stabilization policies
51should concentrate not only on inﬂation and the output gap, but also on indicators
such as credit growth and asymmetries in sectorial responses.
We have focused on variables such as credit and investment, the behavior of
which is independent of the exchange rate regime and the degree of nominal rigid-
ity. This has allowed our empirical analysis to uncover patterns that are common
across MICs. There are important variables, such as inﬂation and unemployment,
which we have not focused on. We plan to do so in future work.
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54Appendix
I .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2
We determine ﬁrst when a bad shock at t+1will lead to insolvency. Suppose
that incumbent managers enter t+1with a supply of nontradables qt+1 and a debt
burden of (1 + ρt)bt dollars. Thus, dollar proﬁts are πt+1 = pt+1qt+1 − (1 + ρt)bt.
It follows that if pt+1 is below a cutoﬀ price pc
t+1 =
(1+ρt)bt
qt+1 , all ﬁrms go bust and
wt+1 equals wt+1. Since in an RSE the debt burden is (1 + ρt)bt = α−1hµtwt,w e
have that p
t+1 <p c
t+1 if and only if the aid payment satisﬁes (3.19). Using (3.16)





Next, we determine the conditions under which the production of N-goods has
a positive NPV: α
θ¯ pt+1









Some algebra reveals that wt > 0 and the sequence {wt+1/wt} generated by net
worth equation (3.17) satisﬁes (8.1) for all t and all guarantees’ sequences {gt} if
and only if (3.20) holds.
In order to establish the existence of a stable RSE we just need to verify that
(3.20), h<α [1 + r] and ηt < 1 for all gt are consistent with each other. The
second condition is necessary for borrowing constraints to exist, while the third
one is necessary for stability. Since ¯ η = 1−c
1−α−1h[1+r]−1 and 0 <c<1, we have that
α−1h<[1 + r] implies that ¯ η must be positive. We can then ensure that (3.20)
holds by setting α−1h low and c high. Lastly, ηt < 1 for all gt if and only if ¯ η<1.
This condition is implied by (3.20).
II. Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
1. Panel regression. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI),
IFS (IMF) and OECD Statistical Compendium.
Criteria for country selection: We consider countries: a) that have a stock
market and the value of the stocks traded as a share of GDP is larger than 1%, b)
that have a population of more than 1 million people, c) that have a per capita
income of more than $1000 but less than $18 000 and d)that are not engaged in
war or civil war (Iran, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Lebanon). In addition, we consider
Finland and Sweden. In total we have 39 countries. The sample covers 20 years,
from 1980 to 1999. The panel is unbalanced, as not all series cover the full sample
or are available for all countries.
55Variables included in the regression: Real credit growth: IMF, International
ﬁnancial Statistics, CD-ROM. Claims on private sector by deposit money banks
(Lines 22d..ZF), divided by CPI (Lines 64..ZF); N/T: Services: World Bank De-
velopment indicators (Code: NV.SRV.TETC.KN), Manufacturing: World Bank
Development indicators (Code: NV.IND.MANF.KN), Construction: OECD Sta-
tistical Compendium, Main indicators of industrial activity and individual cen-
tral banks. See Tornell and Westermann (2002) for selection criteria for N and
T- Sectors; Interest rate spread: World Bank Development indicators (Code:
FR.INR.LNDP); Real interest rate: World Bank Development indicators (Code:
FR.INR.RINR); Gross domestic ﬁxed investment: World Bank Development in-
dicators (Code: NE.GDI.FTOT.KN); Private Consumption: World Bank Devel-
opment indicators (Code: NE.CON.PRVT.KN)
2. VARs. Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) and country sources.
Variables included in the VARs: PPI: IFS, line 63..ZF; CPI: IFS, Line 64..ZF;
Nominal GDP: IFS, line 99B..ZF; Credit: Deposit Money Banks, claims on the pri-
vate sector. IFS, line 22D..ZF; The real exchange rate is computed as the ratio of
PPI/CPI; Nominal GDP and Credit are deﬂated using the PPI index; T-Sector is
proxied by Manufacturing: International Financial Statistics; N Sector is proxied
by Construction: the respective national source: Argentina: Dirección Nacional
de Cuentas Nacionales; Chile: Banco Central de Chile; Korea: Bank of Korea;
Mexico: Bank of Mexico; Peru: Página Web BCR; Thailand: Bank of Thailand,
Economic Data and Accounting System Oﬃce, NESDB; Turkey: Central Bank
of the Republic of Turkey; Japan: Bank of Japan; Germany: Statistisches Bun-
desamt; USA: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis; Sectorial data output data are
available from authors upon request.
3. Probit regressions. Source: World Business Economic Survey (WBES).
Variables included in the regressions: label var gcf “General constraint–
ﬁnancing” 1=no obstacle 4=major obstacle; label var exp_yn “Exports” 1=yes,
2=no; label var exp_pct “% of output exported”; label var yr_estb “year estab-
lished”; label var gvt_pct “Percent government ownership.”
4. Currency Mismatch: Sources: Sources: Bank of Argentina, Bank of Brazil,
Bank of Korea, Bank of Peru, Bank of Turkey, BANXICO, Dirección General de
Investigación Económica. Indicadores Económicos, May 1996 and 2001. Dziobek,
Claudia, J. Kim Hobbs and David Marston, 2000, “Toward a Framework for
Systemic Liquidity Policy,” IMF Working Paper 00/34 (Washington: International
Monetary Fund). Takatoshi Ito and Luiz A. Pereira da Silva: "The Credit Crunch
in Thailand during the 1997-98 Crisis: Theoretical and operational issues with
56the JEXIM survey". Steven Kamin, Philip Turner and Jozef Van ’t dack*, "The
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in emerging market economies: an
overview", mimeo, BIS conference, OECD Bank Proﬁtaility statisitics.
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